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ABSTRACT

i

One of the few new economic developmeht programs to emerge in the
1980s are the Enterprise Zones (EZs). This new economic development
strategy provides incentives to businesses investing in designated distressed
areas.

The areas designated as EZs are within communities that are

considered economically depressed with higher than average unemployment

rates. By offering incentives and programs only available in an EZ,it is hoped
these areas can attract and retain companies that would not locate, stay or

expand there otherwise. Zone economic activity is measured by the number
of jobs created. The proposed research constitutes a more definitive test of
this hypothesis.

This research effort will entail the collection and analysis of secondary

data to test the effectiveness of Enterprise Zones on job creation in general,
operationalized by such indicators as building permits, new business licenses,

capital improvements, employment activity and employment vouchers.
There is much to recommend the idea that engaging a community in
securing its future through improved services, job training, beatification

efforts, and business loans can create change. This is the recurring rhessage
from both the research literature and the local administrators. Although
some important questions remain about the permanence of the jobs created,

most empirical assessments have concluded that state EZ programs are

effective in creating jobs at reasonable costs. Increased zone benefits will help
economic development leaders achieve the ultimate goal of eliminating the
financial disadvantages of urban sites, allowing business to focus on their

111

merits. Allowing such opportunities and trying to boost the local economic

development ideas that are working the best, are the key objectives of the EZ
plan.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Research Problem.

Plant closings and unemployment in basic industries have become

painfully frequent occurrences in many regions of the United States.

Although "deindustrialization" has recently emerged as a political and
economic issue,(Green 1991) it is by no means a new phenomenon. The

economic base of the United States has changed considerably throughout its
history. Most states have thus witnessed a succession of declines in particular

industries. The manufacturing base by 1970 was very different from that of
1920 or 1880(Green 1991). This dynamic change places large demands on the
evolving economic development arena'solving economic development

problems. Economic development is a multifaceted issue, a compound-

complex problem. Any economic development program is judged by its
ability to create jobs, promote economic stability,increase property values and
expand opportunities to achieve good "quality of life" (Lyons and Hamlin
1991).

One of the few new economic development programs to emerge in the
1980s are the Enterprise Zones (EZs). This new economic development
strategy provides incentives to businesses investing in designated distressed

areas. Originally conceived in Great Britain in the late 1970s by Peter Hall,

(Lyons and Hamlin 1991) the EZ approach immigrated to the United States in
the early 1980s, where it was extensively modified and adopted by state

governments (Reeder and Robinson 1992).

Zone economic activity is

measured by the number of jobs created. The proposed research constitutes a
more definitive test of this hypothesis.

When the EZ concept was first unveiled in the United States in 1979,it

was hardly surprising that the radical free market development strategy
should appeal to conservatives like then-Gongressman Jack Kemp, a New

York Republican, and Bronx Democrat, Robert Garcia, willing to try another
approach in areas where programs of the 1960s and 1970s fell short(Guskind
1990). To these politicians, the proposal was in effect, a supply-side program
to save the inner cities: it was the urban complement to the general

conservative strategy of cutting taxes and regulations to stimulate economic
growth. The proposal was eagerly adopted and an enterprise zone bill was

introduced in May 1980. Ronald Reagan adopted EZs as the centerpiece of his
urban proposals during the 1980 election. Enterprise zones became official

Reagan Administration policy in 1981 (Green 1991).
A federal enterprise zone plan actually became law in 1988,but it lacked

teeth and was never carried out. Congress agreed on a more comprehensive

plan in 1992 as part of a broad tax bill, only to have President George Bush
veto it. In May 1993, President Bill Clinton announced a measure called the
Economic Empowerment Act of 1993. On December 21, 1994, the President
and \/ice President A1 Gore announced the designation of 104 urban and rural

Empowerment Zones (EZs) and Enterprise Communities (ECs) across the

country. Whatever they are called, these zones are economic development
tools established in areas that need extra help to become well-developed and

prosperous. Taking a page from state efforts. President Clinton emphasized

the coordination of government aid to distressed areas, rather than tax breaks
for businesses that locate there. The EZ/EC initiative is designed to restore
opportunity to distressed communities by providing the tools they need and
the flexibility they desire, enabling them to rebuild and revitalize, create new

jobs and opportunities, and empower residents to reach their fullest potential.
At the same time, it demands responsibility from local governments,
community organizations, the private sector, universities, and individuals to
develop - and take advantage of - a comprehensive plan that meets local
needs. When he did recommend tax incentives, the President stressed tax

credits for education and training. Preyious Republican proposals focused

primarily on helping zone businesses raise capital. The ultimate goal of zone
programs is to make urban business sites more competitive with those in the
suburbs and more rural areas.

This ideology (the EZ theory), rests squarely oh the assumption that a
mutually dependent and beneficial relationship is formed when, in turn
businesses which locate or expand in the EZ, provide the community with a
variety of long term benefits. For example,these businesses employ the area's
residents, thus decreasing the area's unemployment rate, increase the

community's tax base, diversify and stabilize the economic base,increase the
area's per capita income,and encourage support industries to locate nearby.
By contrast, critics Of the EZ theory, argue that the EZs reliance on

business tax incentives amount to a giveaway to business. According to the

"zero sum" theory,(Reeder and Robinson 1992)they argue that gains received

by EZs may come at the expense of other similarly situated places which do
not have the advantage of EZ status. To them,EZs are a wasteful,expensive

means of encouraging economic development. Another criticism is that it
creates competition among cities and states that can ultimately damage the
local tax structure and shift business costs to state and local governments or to

existing local businesses. Such costs often outweigh the economic benefits
gained from industry's relocation in a state or locality. But,it is difficult to

argUe that this kind of growth comes at the expense of other areas. Thus,this
proposed study offers an empirical test of heretofore competing theories of
Enterprise Zones.

Zone economic activity is measured by the number of jobs created. The
proposed research will constitute a more definitive test of the Enterprise Zone

hypothesis. The researcher conected 7 years(1986- 1992)of AMIGA(the Agua

Mansa Industrial Growth Association) data on Agua ManSa (a state
designated) EZ cphamU

(cities of Riverside, Colton and Rialto, areas

within counties of San Bernardino and Riverside), in order to conduct a

longitudinal study, testing the effects over tinae of EZs as stipulated by
dependent ("Y", "effect" or "then") variables, including building permits,
new business licenses, capital improvements, employment activity and

employment vouchers. This approach surveyed EZ firms (those receiving EZ
benefits) about the effect of EZ policies on job creation. It compared successive
zone employment growth prior to EZ designation.
Of course, the issue of EZs, however important to proponents and

detractors alike, is not the only issue in the social, political, and economic life

of a community. Consequently, though signifiGant in its own right (whether

confirmed or not) as a source of important implications for the literature of
economic development and community planning, the EZ concept is not a
replacement for broader theories concerning local economic development.

In summary, this proposal sets forth some practical objectives. First,
knowing about EZs' abilities to promote successful economic development
can assist policy makers, consultants, citizen organizations and others in

formulating policies to enhance the long-term benefits of their communities.
Second, understanding the EZ concept can aid in devising ways to enhance
inclusiveness (EZs as economic development tools) in local policy making,
especially as more communities engage in strategic planning to cope with the
economic and social changes of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Third, statistical
analysis of the relationship between economic development policies and EZs
can assist local leaders in critically examining alternative strategies for local
economic development. Finally, this research will provide a data base for

continuous evaluation and monitoring of the relationships among EZs and
community long-term benefits.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF THE LITERATURE

Previous Research Studies On Enterprise Zones

Proponents of the EZ program (the EZ theory) assume a mutually

dependent and beneficial relationship is formed when businesses which
locate or expand in the EZ provide the community with a variety of long
term benefits. For example,these businesses employ the area's residents thus
decreasing the area's unemployment rate, business growth increases the
community's tax base, diversifies and stabilizes the economic base, increases

the area's per capita income, and encourages support industries to locate

nearby. Critics of the EZ programs argue that it is difficult if not impossible to
use EZs to target assistance to blighted areas. At best,they claim that EZs are a
zero-sum game, transferring investments from nonzone areas to zones.

Further, they contend that an effective EZ program will require direct
expenditures in human and physical infrastriictures.
A review of EZ literature would not be complete without considering
the works of Reeder and Robinson (1), Guskind (2), and Rubin and Wilder(3).

These works present a generally positive picture of EZs. On the other hand,
the anti-EZ thesis is taken up by Levifan and Miller (4), Osborne (5), and
Stodghill II, Cole and McGuire (6).

Reeder & Robinson argue that recent empirical studies employing
sophisticated methodologies raise questions about earlier studies of taxes and

economic development. They suggest that taxes may significantly affect
business location decisions, at least under certain circumstances (qtd. in

Newman & Sullivan 1988, Nelson 1989). They stipulate that in addition,

most state EZ programs feature nontax provisions that improve local

planning, public services (especially services for businesses), and
infrastructure directed at removing barriers to local economic development

(qtd. in Underhill 1989, Wolf 1990). These nontax provisions are thought to
foster the growth and survival of indigenous small businesses. It is then

difficult to argue that this kind of growth comes at the expense of other areas.
Even where EZs cause firms to relocate, this can result in both efficiency

and equity gains if firms move from wealthy,congested,high-cost areas to less
wealthy,low-cost areas that have excess capacity of public infrastructure, as is

the situation with many distressed rural areas (qtd. in Rubin and Wilder 1989,
U.S. General Accounting Office 1988). Thus, the zero sum argument has less
validity in the case of EZs.

Reeder and Robinson further discuss the two approaches that are most
often used to assess EZ policies. One approach surveys EZ firms (those

receiving EZ benefits) or local EZ coordinators about the effect of EZ policies
on job creation, Survey responses are then converted into gross and net job

growth numbers (net of jobs unaffected by EZ); sometimes multipliers are
used to estimate indirect job growth associated with EZs. The other approach

compares total zone employment growth with either zone employment
growth prior to EZ designation or contemporary growth in a non-EZ portion
of county. State, nation. Of particular interest, they pointed to recent

assessments of EZ programs iii seven states: California (qtd. in California
Office of the Auditor General 1988), New Jersey (qtd. in Rubin and Armstrong

1989), Kansas (qtd. in Patterson and Ambrozier 1988), Illinois (qtd. in Elder
and Cohen 1988), New York (qtd. in Hamilton, Rabinovitz, and Alschuler,Inc.

1990), Wginia (qtd. in yirginia Department of Hptising and Community
Development 1987)/ and Louisiana (qtd. in Louisiana Department of

Economic Development 1990). They found that: (a) EZs have generally

outperformed non-EZ portions of the State in employment growth, and (b)
one-half or more of the new or expanding firms that substantially increased

employment in EZs indicated that EZ policies contributed to their actions.
Reeder and Robinson also pointed to several of the state studies that

produced estimates of cost per job. They figured that if all new jobs reported

by EZfirms(gross jobs) are counted,the gross cost per job ranged from $437in
Virginia to $5,613 in New Jersey. Costs are higher after netting out those jobs

that could not be attributed to EZ policy. Net job costs ranged from $4,117 in
Evansville,Indiana to $13,070 in New Jersey. When indirect jobs are counted,

costs per net job were significantly lower,$3171, in New Jersey. These costs
appear quite reasonable when compared with other economic development
and job creation programs.

Thus, using varying methodologies, most

assessments have concluded that EZs appear to be cost effective in creating
jobs.

Examining few studies of other economic impacts of EZs,they found the
results generally favorable. For example, substantial new investment is

associated with EZs in most states. In California, EZs performed better than
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non-EZs in trends in unemployment rates, assessed property values, and

number of public assistance recipients (qtd. in California Office of the Auditor
General 1988). In Illinois, EZs outperformed the rest of the state in reducing
unemployment rates, but this was thought to be coincidental, since there was

little correlation between individual EZ job growth and decline in EZ
unemployment rates (qtd. in Elder and Cohen 1988). Other studies also have

found that many of the jobs created have been by existing firms and small
businesses and relatively few jobs have actually relocated from other areas;

thus experts have concluded that there is little danger that EZs amount to a
"zero sum game."

Reeder and Robinson concluded that although some important

questions remain about the permanence of the jobs created, most empirical
assessments have concluded that state enterprise zone programs are effective
in creating jobs at a reasonable cost.

Guskind strongly supports the EZ theory of job creation. He cites

versions of this theory being tested in more than 500 "active" state enterprise
zones(more than 1,500 have been designated). Citing the states of Louisiana,
Illinois, Connecticut, Ohio, New Jersey, Kentucky and Missouri, he
underlined spectacular results of their progranas. Based on state estimates,

HUD (Housing & Urban Development), in 1987, reported that enterprise
zones had saved or created about 180,00 jobs and attracted $8.8 billion in

private capital.

A more recent survey by Business Facilities magazine

(February 1990) he continued, estimated that enterprise zones had created

184,600 new johs/ retained 169,100 jot)s and attracted $18,1 billion in
investment through 1988.

Guskind points to further evidence of the successes of EZ in creating

jobs. Evansville,Indiana set up its two-and-half-square-mile enterprise zones
in 1984 in a neighborhood that back in the 1950s, hosted 15,000 workers,

mostly in factory jobs. By the time the zone opened, employment had
plummeted to 4/400. Evansville and the state had invested about $4 million
in public money in the zone to upgrade water mains, build a firehouse,set up

a day-care center for employees and provide other amenities.

The

investment appeared to have paid off. There were 260 businesses in the zone
when it opened. There are now more than 340. Total employment has
jumped more than 50%.
Guskind concluded his argument with a quote by Alan Eric Jones,
Executive Director of the Evansville Urban Enterprise Association "The

enterprise zone is a targeted, focused program. It doesn't just throw money
around. And it creates high paying jobs, not hotel jobs"(51).

Rubin and Wilder analyze the effectiveness of EZ on creating jobs from
a different perspective.

According to them, there is little evidence

demonstrating that the EZ concept is effective at generating new economic
development at the local level. Further, they content that previous research

on enterprise zones does not take into account external effects that may
stimulate or deter economic growth within a zone. So, their study had
sought to mitigate these problems by carrying out a disaggregated analysis of
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new job development within an enterprise zone, and by presenting a method
that enables external growth stimuli and industrial composition to be factored
out of the enterprise zone evaluation process.

Their study also sought to add to the currently small body of empirical
research that examines the effectiveness of enterprise zones as economic

development tools. The study provided an analysis of the employment
benefits and incentive costs of the aforementioned

Evansville, Indiana,

enterprise zone program from 1983 through 1986. Study findings suggested
that the EZ in Evansville has been a relatively cost-effective job-generation
tool. Results of a shift-share analysis reveal significant differences between

the employment growth of the enterprise zone and that of the metropolitan
area. Additional cost-per-job analysis revealed a more complex relationship
between job creation, firm type, and firm size than is generally assumed in
economic development literature.

Throughout the article, empirical evidence was presented regarding key
issues raised in the debate over the effectiveness of enterprise zone programs.

From the analysis, they concluded that the EZ concept can be a cost-effective
local economic development tool.

Levitan and Miller from the other side of the fence, contend that even

in the best of times, poverty and high unemployment remain the rule for

blighted areas. Empirical evidence is lacking that reducing federal taxes and
relaxing regulations will alleviate the problems of inner cities. Taxes play at

best a secondary role in business investment decisions. Other factors they
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noted, (including the availability of a skilied labor force, proxiniity to

transportation and markets, local amenities, and the physical security of the

sites) play a far more important role when businesses consider expansion,
relocation> or starting a hew venture. High unemployment, poverty, and

crime weigh against investing in blighted areas, as do dilapidated
infrastructures and inferior services and amenities. Modest tax incentives

and deregulation alone do not provide adequate inducements to offset the
deterrents of locating in a blighted area. Tax incentives and deregulation,
however, would have at best a nominal impact in increasing the number of
startup businesses. Entrepreneurs, they contend, do not decide to start

businesses because of marginal tax relief. In addition, most small firms

would be unable to utilize the tax credits offered in EZ legislation, because few
businesses in their early years have the tax liabilities needed to take advantage
of taxbreaks.

Levitan and Miller analyze the two policy options for administering aid
to designated areas.

These are tax expenditures and direct subsidies.

Advocates of unfettered free markets argue that policies based on direct

assistance have failed because their reliance on subsidies fosters a dependence
on government handouts. This, they assert, stifles free enterprise and

interferes with market forces. They contend that tax breaks, in contrast,
encourage free enterprise and business growth. The distinction free market
advocates draw between direct subsidies and tax exemptions is not persuasive:

both policies distort free-market operations. EZs are subsections of larger
economic markets, yet tax breaks and deregulation apply only to the zones.
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Enterprise zone theory is premised on gbvemment intervention in the

market to favor a designated area. It follows that the subsidies accompanying
designation may diminish the competitive capabilities of firms outside the
boundaries of the zone, which may be equally depressed. Due to government

intervention, these firms will have a distinct disadvantage compared to their
zone competitors.

Compared with direct subsidies, revenue foregone through the tax code
is normally an ineffective mechanism for revitalizing blighted areas. Tax

expenditures in EZ legislation have few strings attached to their use.
Therefore, there is no guarantee that the income produced by the tax

expenditures will benefit the zones or its residents. A company can choose to
pocket profits generated by the tax credits rather than reinvest in the zone or

hire zone residents. Direct government grants or subsidized loans usually
provide safeguards, requiring use for their intended purposes.
Levitan and Miller further analyzed the "empowerment" ideology of

EZs. Empowerment it seems, will help the poor in the blighted areas and

enable them to forge their destinies. The rhetoric surrounding EZs distorts
reality and tends to obfuscate the needs of blighted area residents along with

the real costs of their rehabilitation. Empowerment cannot be achieved on
the cheap and is not a substitute for direct help. The overall effectiveness of

the EZ program is problematic. Legislation does not address the principal
cause of distress - the idleness or waste of blighted area residents.
Empowering zone residents requires that they become economically selfsufficient. Tax expenditures will not accomplish this, nor will they provide
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the mechanisms heecieci to -'empdwer- zone residents.; Many reside

lack

the basic skills needed for most jobs.
Assisting the residents entails improving their education and skill

levels. Once the residents are able to compete effectively for employment,it
will then not be necessary to bring job opportunities to their back yards.

Equipped with the necessary skills, they will in addition, be able to travel

outside the zone to earn a living.

Improvements in amenities and

infrastructure should address, at a minimum, transportation facilities, police

protection, and the educational and training system. This, assert Levitan and
Miller, is the most effective Strategy to empower the residents of blighted

communities. They concluded that it is difficult if not impossible to use

enterprise zones to target assistance to blighted areas. They claim that at best,
EZs are a zero-sum game, transferring investments from nonzone to zone

areas. An effective enterprise zone program will require direct expenditures,
direct investments in human and physical infrastructures.

Osborne contends that the Jack Kemp's tax-driven version of the
Enterprise Zone does not work. He takes the conservative notion that

creating a healthy market simply by cutting taxes and regulations is simplistic.
The rhetoric question that would be asked is,"how much of a difference are

low taxes going to make in areas that already have low rents and low wages?"
Such communities also have sagging infrastructures, poor housing, and a
shortage of educated, skilled workers - not to mention crime, drugs, illiteracy,

and welfare dependency. To create a healthy market, this entire constellation
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of social pathologies/unskilled labor, arid inadequate services must be
addressed and altered. And if that is to happeri,government must then play a
central role. The keys to s^

are active development strategies, involving

business, government, and the local community.

/ To back Up his argument, Osborrie states that the idea pf EZs is an
import. This is true. Peter Hall> a sdcialist professor in Great Britain,
proposed it after a look at the low-tax,low-wage vitality of Horig Kong. Hall

suggested "freeports" in the worst areas of the inner city: small enclaves free

of taxes, regulations, customs controls, duties and a minimum wage. Things
looked bleak, nothing else had worked, so why not try something truly
audacious? This was an attempt to re-create the Hong Kong of the 1950s arid
1960s inside inner Liverpool or inner Glasgow. The British example,Osborne
asserts is a classic exercise in steering investment to a place, rather than to

people. This, he continues,is fine, albeit expensive,if the goal is to redevelop
a place. He cites a similar strategy that has helped lure private investment
back to Times Square in New York. It could also work to lure plants back to

areas that have lost their manufacturing base but still have a skilled work
force and an adequate infrastructure. He believes that in fact, the state zones

that do work are in precisely these kinds of areas.
Underlining his argument, he cites several studies. Two studies each

in Connecticut and Maryland found no impact. Studies in Illinois and
Louisiana found little change. A study of Indiana's "most successful" zone

found genuine progress, but its authors attributed the success not to tax and
regulatory incentives but to the aggressive recruitment work,backed by hefty
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training and ihfrastruGture grants, of the publicly funded drganization that
managed the zone. This findirig according to Osborne was reinforced by an
in-depth analysis of 90 enterprise zones conducted by Rodney Efickson of
Penn State who Concluded that "One of the key factors that bridged across all

of the high-performance zones was a strong, pro-active development policy"

Osborne concluded by asserting that deep tax incentives may shift
investment geographically, but that they cannot change the way the market

works. In or out of zones, companies still need skilled, literate employees.

No amount of tax incentives can entice firms to hire people who cannot
reach at required levels of proficiency fairly quickly. The distinction here is

between economic growth and economic development. Growth is simply an
increase in output. Development is a process through which people,
communities and firms increase their capacities to produce, creating an
upward spiral that has its own momentum. And, if these incentives were

crafted carefully (to help poor people rather than poor places, and to
minimize the amount of money wasted on investments that would have

been made otherwise), they could play a moderately constructive role in their
own right, aside from their role in guiding state and local governments.

Stodghill II, Gole and McGuire emphasize with the notion that Ezs are

a misguided idea for two reasons. First, government efforts to warp the

market's investment decisions are usually inept and have perverse effects.
Second, backdqor government sweeteners through the tax code increase the
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budget deficit as much as government spending does, but do not attract the

same scrutiny. They tend to be more wasteful as a result. Tax subsidies for
investment which have both these flaws, often cost more than the new

investment they generate.

Further, they contend that on occasion EZs have sparked costly taxgiveaway wars between states. To underline this, they cited some examples.
Specific among these was the tax-giveaway war between Philadelphia,

Washington and Maryland. Parks Sausage Company won out after Maryland

offered $2.3 million in federal urban development action grants, a 10-year
deferment on state property taxes, a new-equipment tax credit, and $200,000 in
wage credits to 100 new employees.

They concluded that in the real world, the enterprise zones set up by
cities and states have a decidedly mixed record. Businesses, it seems, usually
base investment decisions on factors other than tax liability. They cited a
study done in 1989 by the General Accounting Office, Congress' investigative
arm which concluded that three Maryland zones did not stimulate local

economic growth. The GAG found that infrastructure, low crime rates, and
access to labor markets were more important in attracting business than were
tax incentives. It will never be easy to persuade companies to move to
rundown, crime-ridden, urban waste-lands. And with Congress worried
about deficits, the many supporters of enterprise zones may find that cost, in
the end,is an even bigger obstacle than the zones' uneven track record.
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Summary & Conclusions

The Reagan and Bush administration brought a renaissance to the
historic preference of Americans for the image of "laissez-faire" policies. The
idea of the government stimulating competition and entrepreneurial talent
has been a popular one for the past decade, and continues to receive support
from the Clinton Administration. Yet, there is a growing body of literature
that affirms the fact that business and industry today are less sensitive to the
kinds of tax incentives and other financial incentives provided by these
zones. Enterprise Zones cannot recreate for firms through tax expenditures
the economic dynamics that brought them to specific urban/rural locations in
the past.
Although some studies have been successful in detecting positive

effects of tax incentives on firms"location decisions, especially through more
careful model specification,(Newman and Sullivan 1988, Warner 1988 1989)

published research overwhelmingly suggests skepticism over the possibility
that "pure" enterprise zone incentives alone could generate enough
investment and jobs to offset costs of administering the programs; rather, the

increasing importance of other "quality of life" factors emerges, along with
energy, market access, and labor, as key factors (Wasylenko 1981, Funkhouser
and Lorenz 1987, Vaughan 1988, Warner 1989).

This proliferation of conflicting research conclusions regarding state
incentives and economic growth simply underscores how tenuous the

governmenfs reliance on such policy approaches should be. In the absence of
definitive proof that enterprise zones do not work,and with the support of a
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few site-specific examples of enterprise zones that seem to have worked,it is

understandable that state and local governments and other interested parties
will coritihue to;favpr enterprise zones aS;one instrument for pursuing
economic development. In fact. Green and Brintnall (168-169), concluded

that enterprise Zones should be viewed as economic and political concepts,as

well as "a tool for achieving other state objectives," and stress the importance

of examining the relationship of enterprise zones to the broader process of
economic development and to what particular forms and combifiations of

policies are most effective. State-by-state comparisons continue to support the
conclusion that states such as Indiana and New Jersey, which emphasize
neighborhood or community involvement in solving a range of problems,

have successful zones, while states such as Connecticut, which rely on tax
incentives, do not(Enos,1993).

In short, while there is scant evidence to support the ideblogically
oriented enterprise zone policies promoted by Stuart Butler and Jack Kemp,

there is much to recommend the idea that engaging a community in securing
its future through economic opportunity, sustainable community
development, community-based partnerships (true grass roots support),

strategic vision for change and innovation and creativity can create change.
This is the recurring message from both the research literature and the local
administrators.

So, although some important questions remain about the permanence
of the jobs created, most empirical assessments have concluded that state EZ
programs are effective in creating jobs at reasonable costs. Increased zone
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benefits will help economic development leaders achieve the ultimate goal of
eliminating the financial disadvantages of urban sites, allowing businesses to
focus on their merits. Allowing such opportunities and trying to boost the

local economic development ideas that are working the best, are the key
objectives of the EZ plan.
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CHAPTER III

:

RESEARCH DESIGN

I

Secondary Data

This research effort will treat Enterprise Zone as the key independent
variable.

|

Various dependent variables of interest are: building permits, business
licenses, capital improvements, employment activity and employment
vouchers.

,

Operational Definitions of variables
Enterprise Zone(s): a multidimensional variable, which will measure

the rate of job creatioh in terms of building permits, new business licenses,

capital improvements,!employment activity and employment vouchers.
Agua Mansa: an EZ locality, 9,760 acres strategically located in the
western portion of Riverside and San Bernardino Counties and within the
cities of Colton, Rialto and Riverside. It is less than 16 miles from Ontario

International Airport^ served by three transcontinental railroads (Union

Pacific, Southern Pacific and Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe), and three major
freewaysdO,60, and 215). These are essential components of the need and
concerns of firms(Lyons and Hamlin 1991). (See Appendix I,Page 28).
Community long-term

benefits: employment of area's residents

leading to decrease in area's unemployment rate, increase in community's tax
base, diversification and stabilization of the economic base and increase in the
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area's per capita income.

Building permits & new business licenses: measured by total number
issued in the EZ area.

Job creation: measured by new and expanding businesses in zone area
resulting in 10 or more jobs being directly created.
Capital improvements: measured hy new and existing infrastructure

projects like monument sign projects/waste water treatment plant, electrical
improvements and water line upgrades.

Employment

Vouchers:

hiring of disadvantaged individuals

(employees who are participants in programs funded or operated under the
Employee placement and job training). Such programs include job training
programs like GAIN (Greater Avenue for Independence), PICJT/JTPA/JESD

(Private Industry Council Job Training/Job Training Partnership Act/Jobs and
Employment Services Department).

Secondary Data Hypotheses
Leaders from Riverside and San Bernardino counties as well as

representatives from the cities of Colton. Rialto and Riverside formed a joint

powers agency - The Agua Mansa Industrial Growth Association (AMIGA)
partnership, providing businesses a variety of incentives that include state
income tax credits and/or deductions as welT as various financing and

technical assistahce programs;offered by individual localities.
Seven years (1986 - 1992) of AMIGA data on Agua Mansa EZ
community will be analyzed to test the following Hypotheses;
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*H1

Enterprise Zones create a significant(compared with existing #s)
increase in jobs.

*H2

Enterprise Zones create a marked increase in value of building permits
issued.

*H3

Enterprise Zones create a marked increase in number of building
permits issued.

*H4

Enterprise Zones create a marked increase in number of new business
licenses issued.

*H5

Enterprise Zones create a marked increase in value of capital
improvements.

*H6

Enterprise Zones create a marked increase in employment activity.

*H7

Enterprise Zones create a marked increase in employment vouchers.

Secondary Data Sources.

Seven years(1986 - 1992)of AMIGA data will provide the data base. This
research will also provide a data base for continuous evaluation and
monitoring of the relationships among EZs (job creatiori) and community
long term benefits.

Statistical Procedures for Secondary Data.

The researcher will use several statistical procedures to evaluate the

aforementioned hypotheses. First, a principal components analysis will be
performed to determine the relative contribution of building permits,

business licenses, capital improvements and employment activities to EZ and
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to provide a single variable score for those combined variables. Next, the
researcher will derive a series of regression models to investigate the

relationships between the indepehdent variable - EZ - and the various

dependent variables of interests, such as building permits, business licenses,
capital improvements and employment activities. Further, the researcher
will develop regression models to focus on the change over time in each of
the variables. This procedure will lead to interpretations of how EZ will

effect changes in the various dependent variables, reflecting the possibility
that EZ may produce different effects than no job creation.
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CHAPTER IV

Findings & Interpretations of Secondary Data.
Zone economic activity is measured in several ways: the number of

firms qualifying for EZ benefits as a result of investing in a zone, the total
amount of such investments, the number of jobs created, and the number of

jobs retained. So, within this parameter, this research focused on one
empirical question: How effective are Enterprise Zones in general?

The major deterrent to development in the Agua Mansa EZ has been
the lack of developable land, that is, land that can be made available to a

business or developer with the necessary utilities and services in place. This

means infrastructure completed, ready for use, and adequate for future
growth - a major attraction to a firm(s) looking for a new location (Lyons &
Hamlih, 1991). To alleviate this, several projects were and are still in
progress. Examples of these projects include:

A. Agua Mansa Industrial Center (Erin Madison Project). This is a

public/private development partnership of Martin Kanselbaum, Erin
Madison & AMIGA. Late in 1988, staff began work on the establishment of

Community Facilities District(CDF)#89-1, the Agua Mansa Industrial Center.
This Mello Roos District will provide financing for services and facilities
necessary to meet projected demands from commercial and industrial users

locating in the area. Examples are: monument sign projects, waste water

treatment plant, electrical improvements, water line upgrades, signal
improvements and fire protection facilities. The estimated cost for proposed
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facilities and services to be financed under the Mello Rocs bond program is

$16 million. This project will bring 300 to 500 acres of prime industrial
property on line for industrial development.
B. The City of Rialto created a Mello Roos district for the improvement
of roads,sewers and flood control within its jurisdictionary boundaries of the
EZ.

Since its inception, the Agua Mansa EZ has created marked increases

compared with existing #s in various types of business activities (value and
number of building permits, new business licenses, capital improvement
values and employment activity). For example, the total value of building
permits went from approximately $36.5 million in 1987 to $92.6 million in
1989. While number of building permits totaled 280 in 1987, in 1989 3,128
were issued. Total number of new business licenses Went from 18 in 1986 to

107 in 1989 and 134 in 1992, with a cumulative total of 558 by 1992 (272%
increase since 1986). In 1987, capital improvement values totaled $1.7
million. In 1989, the total was well over $12 million and more than $27
million in 1992. In 1987, number of low/moderate income new hires totaled

15 while the number increased to 76 in 1989 and 297 in 1992. See Appendices
II p 29, and III p 30;Tables I p 31,and II & III p 32. The Agua Mansa EZshows
a good mix of businesses, but lean more towards manufacturing and

industrial. This may be attributed to the fact that since the 1930s,creating new

jobs by industrial recruitment has enjoyed considerable favor as a way to
stimulate economic development. Interest in attracting new industrial
manufacturing firms has continued because they provide goods that are
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largely exported outside a region and they therefore can have a dramatic,
sometimes immediate, impact on ernployment and income levels (Luke et al.

1988). Many retail service firms on the other hand, do not export, but rather
recirculate local wealth. These retail services tend to be local in nature and

therefore are seen as having less influence on local economic conditions. The
sharp decrease in business activity between 1989 and 1990,can be attributed to

the beginning of the recession in California (defense budget cuts, end of cold
war,etc.).

The Agua Mansa case research can argue that the EZ approach can

achieve dramatic results where EZs are accompanied by aggressive local
economic development policies. This demonstrates how EZs have helped to
bring the business community, neighborhood groups and the local
governments together to work on projects having economic benefits.

In discussions with Ms. Wendy Holland, Economic/Redevelopment

Project Manager for the city of Colton, the researcher had expressed some
concerns. Were these businesses ''brandnew",that is new start-up businesses,
or businesses from other places moving into the area and taking advantage of

EZ incentives? The response was that no data exists locally or from the state,
and as such it is hard to tell if these businesses moved from some other

locations. Also there was no activity to report business retentions. \Mthin
this period, some businesses closed and some were created.

So, the

conclusion is that questions of EZ program development and evaluation go
hand in hand. There is a need to learn more.
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Conclusion

Although some important questions remain about the permanence of
the jobs created, most empirical assessments have concluded that state EZ
programs are effective in creating jobs at reasonable costs. The government/

here, is showing great foresight in challenging businesses, local governments
and citizens to work together to create local solutions. Increased zone benefits

will help economic development leaders achieve the ultimate goal of
eliminating the financial disadvantages of urban sites, allowing businesses to
focus on their merits. Allowing such opportunities and trying to boost the
local economic development ideas that are working the best, are the key
objectives of the EZ plan.

Federal research guidance on how researchers can develop study

designs for state programs which maximize the possibilities for aggregating
results across studies, would be very valuable. A carefully constructed and
limited federal demonstration program, coordinated with existing state
programs, is also needed. So, we need to learn more. We need more

knowledge about impacts, about goals,and about process. According to Reed,
President Clinton's deputy assistant for economic policy (qtd. in Stackhouse
47), "Economic growth is the most important urban policy, the most

important rural policy, and the most important development policy." Some
of this can come from better and more extensive evaluations, especially those

designed with attention to external validity.
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APPENDIX I: AGUA MANSA ENTERPRISE ZONE MAP
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APPENDIX II: AGUA MANSA EZ NEW BUSINESS LISTING 1986 - 1992

MANUFACTURING

DISTRIBUTION

Cupples Plastic Bags

Pool Water Products

Beall Trans Liner

MBM Corporation
Niagara Water
J. R.Higgins Lumber
Layton Water Service

Stackhouse

Lehigh Portland Cement
NationalPAX

Riverside General Mahufacturtng Co.

Berlin Tire Center,Inc.

Hallcraft Industries
Benchmark Clock

Intematinal Multi-food

Norsea Marine
Atlas Pacific

Technical Metal Service

Doc's Hi-Tech Came Products,Inc.
Astro Seal,Inc.

Digi Tec-Konica Corp.

Zephr Systems,Inc.

INDUSTRIAL

H & H Industries,Inc.
Mark Franzen,Inc.
Blaine Baker Overhead Dqors

West Coast Wife & Steel

ABG Service Corporation
Mortan Industries

CWP

Calfon Construction

Lonigro Castings

Wojtaszek American Creative
Paper Converter

Recat,Inc.

Tigon Industries
LIGHTINDUSTRIAL

COMMERCIAL/RETAIL

GTR/Western Athletics

plaza Las Glorias Market

So.Pacific Pipeline Partnership
Western Landscaping Construction
Master Printing
AAA Quality Service
Ruby Metals
Bauer Building Materials

Little Caesars Pizza

Kretaschmar Steel

Trammel Crow

Thrifty Drug Store
Al's Garden Art
REAL ESTATE

Garner Properties

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES

Bird Products

Regional HeNth Care Co.
Continental Land Title
International Revenue Service

Riverside County Sheriff E)ept
Riverside County Materials Recovry Facility
SOURCE:AMIGA,1994
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APPENDIX III:

AGUA MANSA EZ BUSINESS EXPANSION LISTING 1986 -1992
COMMERCIAURETAIL

LIGHT INDUSTRIAL
Sierra Aluminum

Kaylin Center

Busy Bee
Jimmy D.Nichols

Jake Sisko

Jamie,Omar,Shaheen

Ron Dobson Builders

Magnone Co.

Hawkins/Robertson

CalCorrect Craft

Jensen Contractors

Peter's Auto Body

ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICES

Riverside Radiology

INDUSTRIAL
Brithinee Electric

DISTRIBUTION
MANUFACTURING

Arrowhead Water Company

Bourns

A -1 Aluminum
REAL ESTATE

Case Power Equipment

Koll Business Center

SOURCE:AMIGA,1994
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TABLE I:

SUMMARY AGUA MANSA ENTERPRISE ZONE BUSINESS ACTIVITY 1986-1992

1988

1987

1986

1989

1990

(Six Months)

Total Value of Building Permits $15,287,991 $36,429,035 $52,242,555 $92,604,110 $9,337,093
Total No.ofBuilding Permits
Total No.of New Bus.Licenses

CapitalImprovement Values

Employment Activity:

177

280

270

3,128

159

18

113

A 102

107

22

N/A

$1,714,000 $11,101,503 $12,295,632 $2,567,789

:n/a

'22'.^

15

76

145

(No.of Low/Moderate
Income New Hires)

1992

1991

Total Value of Building Permits $23,688,960 $14,911,348

TotalNo.of Building Permits
Total No.of New Bus. Licenses

CapitalImprovement Values
Employment Activity

Cumulative Total

$244,501,092

287

199

4500

62

134

558

$18,840,000 $27,171,516

$73,690,440

144

297

699

(No.of Low/Moderate
Income New Hires)
SOURCE:AMIGA,1994

* 272% INCREASE IN TOTAL NUMBER OF NEW BUSINESS LICENSES
BETWEEN 1986 &1992
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TABLE H:

AGUA MANSA EZ
NEW BUSINESS LISTING 1986 -1992
NO.

NEW BUSINESSES

%

MANUFACTURING

18

33%

DISTRIBUTION

11

20%

L/INDUSTRIAL

8

15%

INDUSTRIAL

6

11%

COMM/RETAIL

4

7%

ADMIN/OFFICES

6

11%

REAL ESTATE

2

4%

55

100%

TOTAL

TABLE III:

AGUA MANSA EZ

BUSINESS EXPANSION LISTING 1986 ■-1992
BUSINESSES

NO.

%

16% ;

MANUFACTURING
DISTRIBUTION

1

,/ ■

L/INDUSTRIAL

5%
37%

INDUSTRIAL

1

5%

COMM/RETAIL

5

26%

ADMIN/OFFICES

1

5%

REAL ESTATE

1

5%

TOTAL

19

33

100%
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